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 This paper analyses for the period January 1, 1876 to the end of 1913 the factors which 
influenced the Bank of France’s liquidity ratio, defined as the ratio of gold and silver holdings 
to banknotes outstanding. A key aspect of the gold standard, as this period came to be called, 
was the legal obligation on the part of Central Banks to convert on request banknotes into 
gold. France was a bit of an exception among gold standard countries in the sense that the 
Bank of France was not under a strict legal obligation to deliver gold, although in normal 
times it did comply. The Banque of France is known to have frequently refused the delivery of 
gold, especially from 1882 to 1889, to have had the tendency to deliver preferably silver and 
to have used frequently moral suasion to influence the behaviour of banks, gold dealers and of 
large customers.  In any case the Banque of France was submitted to a legal obligation to 
deliver silver and a moral one to deliver gold. From this obligation resulted the “discipline” 
imposed by the stock of metals on governments and Central Banks at the times. The minimum 
metal cover of notes outstanding was established by law and varied from country to country. 
As Central Banks could not let the metal cover of notes issued fall below the legally 
established minimum, it is clear that the liquidity ratio was constantly monitored, leading to 
apprehension when it was falling rapidly and or approaching the legal minimum and to a 
relaxed attitude when it was increasing.  
                                                          
1 This paper is based on a Laurea Dissertation presented on July 7 1997 by Paola Zotti at the Università di 
Brescia entitled “Un’analisi delle determinanti del tasso di sconto in Francia durante il tallone aureo: 1876-1913” 
and written under the supervision of the first author. We thank Hannah Nielsen for research assistance and Paul 
Gregory for helpful comments. 
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 The Central Banks had a very powerful instrument at their disposal to stop the ratio 
from falling and invert its decline. This instrument was the discount rate, which  was the 
interest rate they applied on their lending to commercial banks and to the public2. An increase 
in the discount rate attracted in the first place capital flows and gold from abroad, thus 
contributing to increase the Central Bank’s gold stock. It also reduced the demand for 
rediscounting at the Bank and the level of economic activity in the country, thus reducing the 
stock of banknotes outstanding. Hence both the numerator and the denominator of the ratio 
would move in the right direction. The analysis of the determinants of the liquidity ratio is 
therefore crucial to understand the objectives of monetary policy during the classical gold 
standard to the extent that its changes caused changes in the discount rate and changes in the 
discount rate were the main instrument to control the liquidity ratio. 
 Changes in the discount rate were the most important instrument of monetary policy 
during the classical gold standard. A second instrument was changes in the criteria for admis-
sion to rediscounting by commercial banks and of borrowing by the non-banking private sec-
tor which at that time had also access to Central Bank credit. The third instrument was the use 
of so-called gold devices3 which changed the conditions of gold shipments abroad and hence 
the width of the band around the gold parity within which the market exchange rate fluctuated.  
 In a study on the Reichsbank Sommariva and Tullio (1987) show that the differential 
between the average discount rate of major commercial banks in Berlin and the Reichsbank’s 
discount rate, a measure of the “tension” on the Bank’s gold stock, is a very significant 
determinant of the liquidity ratio. They show that the effect is negative and offer explanations 
of why this should be so. In this paper on France we also focus on the differential between the 
average discount rate of major commercial banks in Paris and the Banque de France’s 
discount rate (henceforth called “the differential”) as the main determinant of the liquidity 
ratio.  
 In addition, we include among the explanatory variables of the liquidity ratio also 
foreign official discount rates and the deviations of the French Franc from the gold parity 
recorded in London. The inclusion of foreign variables allows us to study the extent to which 
the Paris financial market and the Bank of France’s liquidity ratio were influenced by financial 
                                                          
2At that time the Bank of France was was also operating as a commercial bank, as all other gold standard Central 
Banks. 
3 Gold devices were used by Central Banks to avoid sales and exports of gold and/or to make these operations 
more costly to the private sector.  They consisted in raising the sales price of gold, moving the delivery of gold to 
places distant from the border, delivering minted national coins instead of ingots, and increase the interest rates 
on lending to gold exporters in order to increase transaction costs. 
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conditions  abroad, which were the most important gold standard countries influencing Paris, 
the degree of international financial market integration at that time and whether it changed 
significantly from 1876 to 1913. They also allow us to test if there were periods during which 
the use of gold devices by the Bank of France and/or other gold standard Central Banks 
significantly changed the coefficients of the estimated relationships. 
 Like Sommariva and Tullio (1987) we use the data contained in a rather rare volume 
published in 1925 in Berlin by the German Imperial Printing Office and entitled 
“Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik” (1925) (henceforth: VN). They cover four gold standard 
countries (Germany, Great Britain, France and Austria-Hungary) using the same criteria for all 
four countries and contain, besides discount rates and liquidity ratios, also data on exchange 
rates and private (commercial bank’s) discount rates. Other advantages of these data are that 
they are available for the whole period from January 1, 1876 to 1913 and that because of their 
identical construction for four gold standard countries they also allow meaningful 
international comparisons. In this paper we also present stability tests of the estimated 
regressions to gain insights into whether the working of the gold standard changed 
significantly during this 38 year period. 
 The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 presents the model explaining the Bank of 
France’s liquidity ratio taking into account international influences. Section 2 describes in 
detail the data used and how the variables have been constructed. Section 3 presents the 
estimates of the model and Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
1. The model 
 In this section we present an equation explaining the changes in the Bank of France’s 
liquidity ratio. Following Sommariva and Tullio (1987) it is assumed that changes in the 
liquidity ratio depend on the differential between the private and the official discount rate in 
France. However, in order to test how the degree of international   financial market integration 
changed through time and which foreign Central Banks most influenced the Banque de 
France, a set of variables capturing international influences (market exchange rates and for-
eign official discount rates) was included among the explanatory variables. 
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where ilD  denotes a change in the liquidity ratios of the Bank of France. We shall use a 
narrow (i=1) and a broad definition (i=2). The first is the ratio of the gold and silver stock to 
banknotes issued by the Bank of France (l1) , and the second has the same numerator but in-
cludes in the denominator sight liabilities in addition to banknotes issued ( 2l ). D stands for a 
change of the variable. In this case D does not denote the usual difference operator, since in 
our data set the changes refer to differently spaced time points. The residuals are denoted by u. 
F
P ii -  denotes the differential between the private discount rate in Paris and the Bank 
of France’s discount rate. The superscript  F  stands for France; jiD  denotes changes in the 
discount rate of country j, where the superscript Ej =  stands for Great Britain, D  stands for 
Germany and  A  for Austria-Hungary; *j
*
jj
j e/)ee(w -=  denotes percentage deviations of the 
market exchange rate of the French Franc with the currency of country  j  with respect to the 
gold parity; the asterisk indicates the gold parity and the variable “ je ” the market exchange 
rate. Note that the gold parity never changed during the whole period for Great Britain, 
Germany and France. 
 Equation (1) states that the main domestic determinant of changes in the liquidity ratio 
is the differential which reflects the situation of the domestic business cycle and the liquidity 
position of the Paris financial market. The differential must have had a very high informative 
content for the markets and the monetary authorities4. An increase in the differential put the 
Bank of France under strain as it led to an increased demand for rediscounting on the part of 
commercial banks and an increased demand for banknotes, metals and Bank of France credit 
by the private sector and hence led to a fall in the liquidity ratio.  
 The channels between the business cycle and the liquidity ratio or its components have 
been studied by Goodhart (1972) for Great Britain, McGouldrick (1984) and Sommariva and 
Tullio (1987) for Germany and more recently by Contamin and Denise (1999) for France. 
Unfortunately we cannot introduce the business cycle into this model because we have no data 
on industrial production and/or GDP comparable to those of VN.  
 In addition to the differential, the liquidity ratio is assumed to depend on foreign 
discount rates and the deviation of market exchange rates from the gold parity. The expected 
signs of the coefficients of the explanatory variables are: negative for the differential, negative 
for changes in foreign official discount rates and negative for the deviation of the exchange 
rate from the gold parity. The exchange rate is defined as the number of French Francs per 
                                                          
4At that time data on GDP and industrial production were not available. 
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foreign currency unit (British Pound); hence an increase in je  indicates a depreciation of the 
French Franc (capital and gold outflows from France). 
For the exact definition of the variables and for the time span to which they refer see 
Section 2. Suffice to mention here that the series used are not equidistant time series but they 
refer to timely ordered episodes of all official discount rate changes which occurred during the 
period. From 1876 to 1913 the Bank of France changed the official discount rate 35 times. 
Changes in foreign discount rates are measured over a period similar to the one chosen 
by the compilers of the tables of VN to measure changes in liquidity ratios. The exact 
definition of the intervals over which the changes in the foreign discount rates are measured is 
also discussed in Section 2. 
 
 
2.  Description of the data used 
 The VN data used in this paper are obtained from a 1925 volume entitled Verglei-
chende Notenbankstatistik: Organisation und Geschäftsverkehr Europäischer Notenbanken, 
1876 – 1913. This two-volume publication contains monthly and annual financial data for 
seven European countries: Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, Great 
Britain and Russia. For four countries: France, Germany, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary 
there are more detailed tables containing a wealth of data relating to each official discount 
rate change. For France the relevant table is Table 134 (pages 246 and 247 of Vol. 2). In order 
to facilitate the description of the data we partially reproduce below in Table 1 the columns of 
Table 134 of VN and the data actually used in the empirical work.  
 The one and a half page long introduction to this set of tables in VN contains the 
following sentence: “These tables represent an attempt to explain with a purely numerical 
methodology those factors taken into consideration in deciding changes in the discount rate at 
the time the changes were enacted. These factors were the balance sheet of the Central Bank 
on the days prior to the change, confronted with another balance sheet chosen on purpose by 
the compilers of the table (italic our addition), the foreign exchanges and some foreign dis-
count rates” (VN, page 238). This sentence and the data description which follows go a long 
way in explaining what the German compilers were aiming at. They certainly knew very well, 
long before these concepts became current, what a reaction or an objective function of a 
Central Bank is. 
 The first column in Table 1 contains the month, day and year of the official discount 
rate change. The second column contains the date of the closest statement of the Bank of 
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France used by the compilers of the table, and possibly also by the members of the Board at 
the meeting during which the discount rate change was decided5, to analyse the factors 
leading to the decision to change the discount rate. The date of the closest statement coincides 
with the day of the discount rate change in 33 out of 35 cases.6 The third column contains the 
date of the more distant statement used for comparison. The interval between the two 
statements was chosen by the compilers of the table. In choosing these reference intervals the 
compilers were interested in eliminating disturbances to the balance sheet items of the Bank 
caused by seasonal factors or special events. For the whole period the average interval 
between the two statements was 57.4 days. The interval increased from 54 days in the period 
1876-1895 to 62.7 days in the period 1896-1913. The increase observed from the first to the 
second period in the reference interval may be an indication that the Bank of France was 
operating the domestic gold standard with a more  
abundant gold stock and that it felt more relaxed about its main duty, which was to maintain 
internal convertibility of banknotes.  
 Columns 4 and 5 contain the changes in the narrow and broad definition of the liquidity 
ratio between the two dates reported in columns 2 and 3.  1l  is defined as the ratio between 
the gold and silver stock of the Bank of France and its banknotes outstanding.  2l  is defined 
as the ratio of the gold and silver stock of the Bank to the sum of banknotes issued plus sight 
deposits. 
 Column 6 contains the differential between the average private discount rate of major 
commercial banks in Paris and the official discount rate of the Bank of France on the day 
prior to the discount rate change. It is worth mentioning that in VN this differential is called 
“the tension” (Spannung in German).  
 Column 7 reports the exchange rate, defined as the number of French Francs per Pound 
in London, on the day before the discount rate change. In order to obtain the percentage 
deviations of the market exchange rates from gold parity, we used the gold parity reported in 
Gallarotti (1995), where one Pound is equivalent to 25.225 French Francs.  
 
                                                          
5This is our supposition.  
6 On one occasion it preceeds the day of the discount rate change by one day (May 26, 1876) and on one 
occasion it follows it by one day (October 16, 1878), where the dates indicated in parenthesis refer to the day of 
the discount rate change.  
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Table 1: Discount rate changes of the Bank of France, 1876 – 1913. Some representative data at the beginning and at the end of the period. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 











2lD  FP ii -  
Ee  DiD  EiD  AiD  
1 May 26, 1876 May 25, 1876 Jan. 6, 1876 15,2 67,3 -2,00 25,23 -2,5 -3,0 -0,5 
2 Apr. 5, 1877 Apr. 5, 1877 Jan. 4, 1877 5,8 72,5 -1,25 25,16 -0,5 0,0 0,0 
3 Oct. 16, 1878 Oct. 17, 1878 Aug. 29, 1878 -5,3 -3,1 0,75 25,325 0,0 1,0 0,0 
4 May 23, 1879 May 23, 1879 Jan. 2, 1879 13,3 9,0 -1,25 25,195 -1,5 -3,0 -0,5 
5 Oct. 23, 1879 Oct. 23, 1879 Aug. 21, 1879 -10,4 -6,8 0,375 25,28 0,5 0,0 0,0 
6 Apr. 1, 1880 Apr. 1, 1880 Jan. 2, 1880 8,8 7,3 -0,875 25,27 0,0 0,0 0,0 
7 Oct. 14, 1880 Oct. 14, 1880 Aug. 26, 1880 -10,9 -4,6 0,5 25,335 0,0 0,0 0,0 
M            
33 May 17, 1912 May 17, 1912 Jan. 4, 1912 8,3 6,6 -0,375 25,225 0,0 -1,0 0,0 
34 Oct. 17, 1912 Oct. 17, 1912 Aug. 22, 1912 -8,1 -5,3 0,25 25,245 0,0 2,0 0,0 
35 Oct. 31, 1912 Oct. 31, 1912 Aug. 22, 1912 -11,0 -8,5 0,0 25,235 0,5 2,0 0,5 
 
Source: Table 134 of VN 
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 Changes in the official discount rates in Germany ( DiD ), Great Britain ( EiD ) and Aus-
tria-Hungary ( AiD ) (see columns 8 to 10) are not reported in Table 134 of VN. For their con-
struction, we had to use information contained in the other tables of VN. As for these three 
foreign countries, VN contains daily figures of the official discount rate for the whole period 
1876-1913, we calculated for each of the 35 episodes of changes in the Bank of France’s dis-
count rate the corresponding changes in the three foreign official discount rates with reference 
to the interval between the date in column 3 and the day before the discount rate change. 
 To summarize four observations are in order. First, the data presented in Table 1 can be 
divided into four main categories:  
A. For each discount rate change information on the balance sheet items of the Bank of 
France, in other words on its assets and liabilities, on two reference days as described above.  
B. The differential between the private discount rate of major commercial banks in Paris and 
the official discount rate of the Bank of France on the day prior to the discount rate change.   
C. The market exchange rate of the French Franc with the Pound on the day preceding the 
change in the discount rate. 
D. The changes in foreign official discount rates. 
 Second, the series contained in each column are not equally spaced chronologically 
ordered data; hence the frequency of the data is variable depending on the time elapsed be-
tween one discount rate change and the next. Third, there is virtually no degree of discretion 
on our part in the way the series were constructed. How they are constructed follows logically 
from a careful analysis of Table 134. Fourth, the compilers of the table were not just 
statisticians, they were economic historians writing a history of the gold standard in numbers. 
We presume that they must have had substantial inside information on how decisions were 
taken and on how the system was actually working. They may have written the book with 
some degree of longing for stability in international monetary matters which in 1925 was no-
where near in sight. They may have written it with the same spirit which guided Egyptian 
scholars in the third and second centuries BC to write down as much as they could about a 
disappearing culture7.   
By estimating equation (1) with the data presented in this section we make use of an in-
credible wealth of information which has never been used before. 
 
 
                                                          
7Most of the written Egyptian documents concerning the Egyptian culture date from these last centuries. 
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3. Domestic and foreign determinants of the Banque de France’s liquidity ratios 
  In this section we present ordinary least squares estimates of equation (1) which ex-
plains changes in the liquidity ratios ilD , ,2,1i =  of the Bank of France for the period from 
1876 to 1913. The hypothesis underlying the equation is that foreign discount rates (DiE, DiD, 
DiA ), the exchange rate of the Franc with the Pound8 and  the differential FP ii -  played a sig-
nificant role in determining fluctuations of the liquidity ratios. We started out with all ex-
planatory variables in the regression and then eliminated successively all non significant ones. 
  The estimates are presented in Table 2. The exchange rate of the Pound is never signifi-
cant. The differential has a significant negative effect on the liquidity ratios as expected. A 
100 basis points higher differential on the day prior to the official discount rate change implies 
a fall of 4.6 to 6.4 percentage points in the first liquidity ratio and 1.9 to 2.4 in the second. 
France differs significantly from Great Britain and Germany insofar as the effect of the 
differential on liquidity ratios is roughly half. (Tullio and Wolters 2004a and 2004b). This 
difference in behaviour between France and the other countries may imply that the Banque de 
France was stabilizing to some extent its liquidity ratios by using credit and foreign exchange 
controls and limiting access to its metal stock, especially its gold stock. Tullio and Wolters 
(2003) present evidence that this was particularly the case between 1882 and 1889. They base 
this evidence on estimates of the Bank’s reaction function and on excerpts from the minutes 
of the September 13, 1888 meeting of the Conseil Général de la Banque de France. In 
addition, one should not forget that the Banque de France was not legally obliged to convert 
notes into gold as it could offer instead silver for conversion9. Finally Flandreau (1995) and 
Contamin and Denise (1999) show that the Bank was systematically selling gold at a premium 
thus regulating the foreign exchanges with this tool. It stopped using the premium only in the 
first decade of the 20th century when it started performing open market operations in the 
London financial market to stabilize British interest rates in order to protect the Bank of 





                                                          
8Data on the exchange rates of the Franc with the Reichsmark and the Austro-Hungarian currency are not 
available from our source for the whole period.  
9The Bank of France’s silver holdings were very large compared to the other Central Banks considered in this 
paper.  
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Table 2:  The determinants of the French liquidity ratios 
Period 1876 – 1913  (T = 35) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 






























DiD   -3.497 
(4.1) 
   -3.444 
(5.5) 
 
EiD  -2.207 
(4.7) 
   -2.133 
(6.4) 
  
Di1D D    -2.027 
(1.9) 
   -2.313 
(3.3) 




  -2.611 
(8.2) 
2R  0.746 0.718 0.811 0.795 0.735 0.693 0.815 
DW 2.52 2.12 2.49 2.37 2.59 2.23 2.73 
AIC 5.463 5.567 5.191 5.248 4.943 4.943 4.452 


























































Absolute values of the t-statistics are given in parantheses, p-values in brackets.  DW denotes the 
Durbin-Watson statistic. Q(10) denotes the Box-Pierce Portmanteau statistic with 10 lags to test for 
white noise in the residuals. HET is the White test for heteroskedasticity in the residuals.  The RESET 
test tests against specification errors.  The Akaike (Schwarz) information criterium is denoted as AIC 
(SC).  
 
 Our data show that the variance of 1lD  and 2lD  for France was 1/6 to 1/3 of the vari-
ance in Great Britain and Germany. This remarkable stability of the liquidity ratios of the 
Bank of France is difficult to explain without a more intensive use of credit controls and gold 
devices, a larger degree of discretion on the part of the Bank, and the heavier exercise of 
moral suasion on the banking system and on other customers. Thus the results presented sug-
gest that France’s relatively limited number of official discount rate changes was not only due 
to its higher metal stock but also to the “stabilization” of liquidity ratios by means of direct 
controls. 
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When changes in the British and German discount rates are introduced together, neither 
has a coefficient which is significantly different from zero. However, when introduced 
separately they are both significantly different from zero and have the expected negative sign 
(cf. regressions (1) and (2) or (5) and (6) of Table 2). A 100 basis points increase in the 
official discount rate in Germany led to a decrease of about 3.5 percentage points in both 
liquidity ratios (see regressions (2) and (6) of Table 2). The effect of changes in the Bank of 
England’s discount rate is smaller than Germany’s; however, it is more significant and the 
regressions with the British discount rate (and without the German one) explain a higher 
fraction of the variance of the dependent variable10 (cf. regressions (1) and (2) or regressions 
(5) and (6) of Table 2). These two factors would suggest that for Paris London was more 
important than Berlin, at least for the average of the sample period11. 
A closer investigation reveals that DiD  had a significant effect on ilD , ,2,1i =  only in 
the period from 1876 to 1895 and that  EiD  had a significant effect only in the period from 
1896 to 1913.12 Owing to the insufficient number of observations, we could not estimate 
equation (1) separately for these two sub-periods. Therefore, we defined a dummy variable D1 
which is equal to one for observations 1 to 21 (1876 to 1895) and zero otherwise and a 
dummy variable D2 which is equal to 1-D1 (1 from 1896 to 1913 and zero otherwise). We 
then multiplied D1 with DiD  and  D2  with EiD  and ran the regressions again with these new 
explanatory variables. 
The chosen subdivision of the period is justified by several historical facts. Among them 
should be mentioned the end of the long period of declining prices in the gold standard world 
in connection with the discovery of new gold mines and of a new process to extract gold and 
the end in the late 1880s and early 1890s of a period characterized by a more intensive use of 
gold devices on the part of the Banque de France and the Bank of England. Other important 
developments to justify the split were the improved communication and transportation 
technology, the increased degree of integration of financial markets worldwide, the increased 
economic and financial weight of Germany in the world economy and the development of the 
Pound as an international reserve currency.  
The regressions with the newly defined explanatory variables are also contained in 
Table 2 (see regressions (3), (4) and (7)). The finding that Berlin influenced Paris only in the 
                                                          
10See also the AIC and SC statistics. 
11This conclusion that London was more important for Paris is in line with the findings of Tullio and Wolters 
(2003).  
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first period and London only in the second has two possible non-conflicting explanations. 
First it may be explained by the large disturbance caused by Germany in the first sub-period 
to the world gold market, and especially in its early years, when it was trying to first establish 
and then consolidate its new monetary system by purchasing large amounts of gold at a time 
when production was rather low. This “German effect” was magnified by the fact that several 
minor European countries which did not want to see their currency depreciate were forced to 
also adopt the gold standard. Hawtrey (1927) characterized this uncoordinated and abrupt 
move by Germany as the greatest disturbance to hit the international monetary system in the 
second half of the 19th century and considered it as the main cause of the long phase of 
declining world prices which lasted from 1873 to 1895.  
Second Tullio and Wolters (2004a) find strong evidence of a more intensive use of gold 
devices on the part of the Bank of England from about 1885 to 1892/3. During this period the 
influence of the German discount rate on the British liquidity ratios become insignificant. This 
more intensive use of gold devices on the part of the Bank of England, coupled with a more 
intensive use by the Banque de France from about 1882 to 1889, may have severed the Paris 
financial market from the London one for a good part of the period 1876-1895. Both these 
factors, a large monetary shock originating in Germany and a more intensive use of gold 
devices by France and Great Britain, could have  contributed in the first period to reduce the 
coefficient of changes in the Bank of England’s discount rate to insignificance while at the 
same time enhancing the German influence on Paris.  
The Adjusted R2’s of the regressions of Table 2 range from 0.69 to 0.82. They are 
extremely high considering that the dependent variable is defined as a change. The residuals 
of the regressions of Table 2 are well behaved: they pass the standard tests of absence of auto-
correlation and heteroskedasticity and the normality hypothesis cannot be rejected. They also 
pass the Functional Form Misspecification F-RESET test. Figure 1 presents the Cusum of 
Squares test and the recursive parameter estimates of the regression explaining 1lD  as a func-
tion of EiD  and the differential in Paris (regression (1) of Table 2). Figure 2 presents the 
corresponding tests for the regression explaining Dl2 (regression (5) of Table 2). Figures 1 and 
2 show that the regressions are stable as the statistic of the Cusum of Squares test does not 
move outside the 5% confidence interval. By adding the German discount rate to the British 
one the regression becomes unstable, as shown by the Cusum of Squares test for regression 
(7) of Table 2 (see Figure 3). The substitution of the German discount rate to the British one 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
12 See for instance the recursive parameter estimates in Figures 1 and 2. Recursive parameter estimates for 
regressions 2 and 6 of Table 2 are not presented to save space. 
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also makes the regression unstable, as shown by the Cusum of Squares test for regression  (6) 
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Figure 3: CUSUM of Squares tests
CUSUM of Squares of regression (6) CUSUM of Squares of regression (7)
 
The recursive parameter estimates are also contained in Figures 1 and 2. For both stable 
regressions (regressions (1) and (5)) one observes a tendency of the coefficient of the 
differential to fall in absolute value while the coefficient of changes in the Bank of England’s 
discount rate increases in absolute value. In particular one sees that the coefficient of EiD  is 
not significantly different from zero in the first sub-period (1876-1895) and starts increasing 
sharply in absolute value after the 18th observation which corresponds to the January 24 1889 
change in the Paris discount rate. The increased influence of London on Paris in the second 
period is likely to have something to do with the end of the more intensive use of gold devices 
on the part of both the Banque de France and the Bank of England, although it must have been 
superimposed on a longer run tendency of French financial markets to become more 
integrated with the rest of Europe, a long run tendency which also slowly reduced the 




4. Summary of main results and conclusions 
 In this paper we have presented an equation explaining changes in the Bank of France’s 
liquidity ratios during the classical gold standard (1876-1913). These are assumed to depend 
on the differential between the private and the official discount rate in Paris, on foreign 
discount rate changes and on deviations of the exchange rate of the French Franc with the 
Pound from the gold parity. Two liquidity ratios are used in this paper, a narrow and a broad 
one. In estimating the model it does not make much difference whether one uses the narrow or 
the broad definition. 
 We use data from Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik (1925) referring to all episodes of 
discount rate changes enacted by the Bank during the period. Since there were 35 such 
changes we have 35 observations. Thus the data used is “not equally spaced chronologically 
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ordered”. We present stability tests in order to study the changes in the role of the 
determinants of the liquidity ratios and in the working of the gold standard over time.  
 The estimates presented in this paper suggest the following main conclusions. First, the 
differential played an important role in transmitting disturbances from the real sector and from 
the Paris financial market to the Bank of France’s liquidity ratios. Second, foreign influences 
on French liquidity ratios cannot be neglected. Of the three foreign countries considered in 
this paper, Great Britain was the most important for French liquidity ratios, confirming the 
view held by contemporaries, followed closely by Germany. The regressions with changes in 
the London discount rate as explanatory variable had the highest explanatory power and were 
stable. Vienna’s discount rate changes did not influence French liquidity ratios. The exchange 
rate of the Franc was not found to be a significant determinant of liquidity ratios. Third, the 
explanatory power of the estimated regressions is between 69 and 82%, which is very high 
considering that the dependent variable is a change. The residuals are well behaved. 
 Fourth, the recursive parameter estimates presented in this paper and the strong state-
ments made by M. le B.on de Rotschild at the September 13 meeting of the Conseil Général 
(Board Meeting) of the Bank of France (see Tullio and Wolters, 2003) suggest that the Bank  
may have used gold devices more intensively from about 1882 to 1889. Fifth, besides the 
more intensive use of gold devices from 1882 to 1889 on the part of the Bank of France, we 
also find some evidence of a systematic use of domestic credit controls and moral suasion. 
 Sixth, we decided to split the period from 1876 to 1913 into two sub-periods, using 1895 
as the dividing line. The justifications for choosing this date are mentioned in Section 3. By 
splitting the period we find that in the first sub-period (1876-1895) the Reichsbank’s discount 
rate had significant effects on French liquidity ratios while the Bank of England’s did not. 
This is especially true for the broad liquidity ratio. In the second period (1896-1913) instead 
the London discount rate became significant while Berlin’s discount rate became insignificant.  
 Seventh, we found evidence that after 1895 the degree of financial market integration in 
Europe was substantially higher. This greater integration was due in part to the fact that in the 
second period the Bank of France and the Bank of England used gold devices less intensively 
or abandoned them altogether and in part to the development in communication technology. In 
parallel with the increased influence of London on Paris in determining the French liquidity 
ratios, we find that the role of the Paris differential is reduced.  
 Eighth, turning to the validity of the multi-polar, bi-polar or “conductor of the orches-
tra” views of the international gold standard, our results strongly support a bi-polar or multi-
polar view rather than “the conductor of the orchestra view” allegedly held by Keynes (1930). 
 17 
We saw in this paper how Germany closely competed with Great Britain in determining 
changes in the French liquidity ratios to the point of “excluding” Great Britain in the first sub-
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